ABSTRACT
Over four decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that students were not entitled to robust due process protections when public institutions dismissed them on academic grounds. A subsequent Supreme Court decision reinforced the notion that courts should defer to academic decisions that were based on “genuine professional judgment.” In the years since these decisions were announced, federal (and some state) courts have shown considerable deference to academic judgments in cases brought by faculty challenging denials of promotion or tenure, and by students challenging academic dismissal decisions, often dismissing the lawsuit or awarding summary judgment to the institution, seemingly without a thorough review of the institution’s supporting evidence for its exercise of “genuine professional judgment.” Although scholars have roundly criticized judicial deference, especially when discrimination claims are before the court, deference persists to this day in most, but not all such litigation. This article traces the development of judicial deference in decisions involving faculty and student plaintiffs, discusses why courts refuse to defer in a few cases, and suggests implications for college and university defendants facing litigation involving academic judgments.
