**HOW THE HOSTY COURT MUDDLED FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS BY MISAPPLYING HAZELWOOD TO UNIVERSITY STUDENT SPEECH**

LAURA MERRITT*

INTRODUCTION

When the Supreme Court ruled that public school officials could control speech in school-sponsored activities if they had legitimate educational reasons for doing so, the majority explicitly reserved judgment on whether that same level of deference should be extended to college and university settings.¹ In the seventeen years since the decision, courts have relied on the *Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier* standard to allow broad controls over expression in public elementary, middle, and high schools. In only one instance among newspapers not found to be a forum for student expression did a court find that school officials did not have a sufficient reason to control expression.² In the case, *Desilets v. Clearview Regional Board of Education*, the court invalidated a high school’s attempts to block two movie reviews from appearing in the student newspaper because while the movies were R-rated, the reviews themselves were not objectionable.³ Otherwise, since the *Hazelwood* decision, courts have given educators broad discretion to control student expression and determine for themselves what will constitute an “educational reason” to control expression in contexts ranging from newspaper articles and advertisements to class T-shirts and school plays.

* Laura Merritt is a 2007 Juris Doctor candidate at American University Washington College of Law. She received a Bachelor of Science in Journalism, cum laude, and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, cum laude, from the University of Florida. She has previously served a variety of editorial roles at the *Independent Florida Alligator*. She has also had legal internships for the Student Press Law Center, the Society of Professional Journalists, and the American University Office of the General Counsel, though the views expressed in this Note are her own. She would like to thank Adam Goldstein, Barbara Marrin, and Anna Molpus for thorough critiques and helpful suggestions during the writing process, as well as her family, friends, and former co-workers for their inspiration and encouragement.

¹ *Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier*, 484 U.S. 260, 273 & n.7 (1988) (noting that “we need not now decide” if the decision’s standard applies in higher education).

² *But see* Dean v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that a high school principal could not prevent the publication of a school newspaper that existed as a limited public forum).

³ *Desilets v. Clearview Reg’l Bd. of Educ.*, 647 A.2d 150, 153–54 (N.J. 1994) (distinguishing the subject from the content used to address the subject).
Until the Seventh Circuit decided *Hosty v. Carter* in June 2005, no court had upheld *Hazelwood*’s application to independent student speech at a public college or university. Instead, courts determined First Amendment protections for college and university students with the same forum analysis generally applied to speech cases. The Supreme Court has prevented colleges and universities from denying funding to student newspapers based on viewpoint once it created an open forum for communication and allowed colleges and universities to collect fees used to fund a viewpoint-neutral range of student expression. The few decisions where *Hazelwood* has been cited concerning college and university settings are limited to recognizing college and university authority over curricular activities or the schools’ own speech. Further, courts have insulated public colleges and universities from liability for the content of student publications, acknowledging that the First Amendment prohibits colleges and universities from exercising editorial control over the publications.

In *Hosty*, the Seventh Circuit broke from precedent by granting qualified immunity to a dean from Governors State University who called the printers to stop publication of a student newspaper. In the en banc decision, the court considered questions beyond the immunity decision being appealed and held that the *Hazelwood* framework “generally appl[ied]” to university student speech.

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5. *See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth*, 529 U.S. 217, 229–30 (2000) (determining that public forum cases were applicable “by close analogy” to extracurricular speech funded by mandatory student fees); *Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.*, 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995) (engaging in a forum analysis).
6. *Rosenberger*, 515 U.S. at 835 (“Having offered to pay the third-party contractors on behalf of private speakers who convey their own messages, the University may not silence the expression of selected viewpoints.”).
7. *Southworth*, 529 U.S. at 234 (contending that the University created “what is tantamount to a limited public forum”).
8. *See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson*, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285–87 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying *Hazelwood* to a university student’s speech that was part of a class assignment, occurred during class time, and took place in the classroom); *Brown v. Li*, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying *Hazelwood* to a graduate student’s thesis submission); *Bishop v. Aronov*, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying *Hazelwood* to restrict a university professor’s in-class speech to educational topics and limit his discussion of his personal religious beliefs). *See also* Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that *Hazelwood* had little application to the university yearbook in question because the university created a limited public forum).
10. *See Hosty III*, 412 F.3d at 739 (explaining that public officials should not have to predict how constitutional questions will be interpreted by later courts).
11. *See id.* at 733, 738 (explaining that the threshold question in an interlocutory appeal for
Reviewing a qualified immunity decision required the court to view the facts in the light most favorable to the newspaper’s editors, students Jeni Porche and Margaret Hosty. Given this view, the court found that the University had created a limited public forum, something that the University actually acknowledged. Still the court decided that the confusion about Hazelwood was enough to grant immunity.

This Note will examine the Hosty decision and the Seventh Circuit’s unfortunate interpretation of Hazelwood to find that the University administrator’s actions did not violate “clearly established” law. Part I will discuss the facts and procedural history of Hosty as well as First Amendment case law that played a significant role in the decision. Part II will provide a critical legal analysis of the Seventh Circuit’s majority decision, its reasoning, and the dissenting opinion. This section will illustrate how the court confuses government funding for an open forum with government funding for its own speech. It will argue that the court relied on its own disingenuous forum analysis—accomplished by isolated examinations of funding, age, and educational status—to demonstrate that the students’ claims were based on unsettled law. Finally, Part III will address the chilling effect the Hosty decision could have on student activities at public colleges and universities, and the potential increased liability colleges and universities could become subject to as a result of a perceived newfound authority over student expression. This section will recommend that future decisions in this area of law reject the Hosty decision and clarify that Hazelwood’s reasonableness standard should not be applied to public fora. It will alternately discuss some steps that college and university students and administrators can take to minimize conflicts between students and administrators.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts and Procedural History of Hosty

In the fall of 2000, administrators at Governors State University, a public university in Will County, Illinois, were upset with articles critical of the University printed in the student newspaper, the Innovator. Some of the articles focused on the English department and alleged racial biases in grading, unqualified teachers, and a lack of course variety. Other articles were critical of the decision

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12. Id. at 744 (Evans, J., dissenting) (“Defendants concede that the [Innovator] serves as a public forum.”) (quoting Hosty v. Governors State Univ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 782, 786 (N.D. Ill. 2001)). But see Brief of Defendant-Appellant Patricia Carter at *20–*21, Hosty v. Carter, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-4155) (contending that the Innovator did not constitute a public forum) [hereinafter Brief].


14. See id. at 732 (noting that none of the newspaper’s critical articles were about the missing apostrophe in the University’s title); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *5, Hosty v. Carter, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 05-377), 2005 WL 2736314 [hereinafter Petition].
of Patricia Carter, the dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, not to renew the teaching contract of the newspaper’s faculty advisor. University President Stuart Fagan and Dean Carter issued public statements condemning the Innovator’s “irresponsible and defamatory journalism.” President Fagan characterized the newspaper as “one-sided,” “inaccurate,” and “insulting” and said the newspaper “sullied” the reputation “of the [U]niversity and its faculty.”

While tensions about the newspaper were high, Dean Carter twice called the publisher, Regional Publishing, and ordered its owner not to print any more copies of the paper without calling her first so that she or another administrator could review the newspaper. After Dean Carter’s phone calls, Regional Publishing’s owner, Charles Richards, believed he would not be paid if he printed the paper without following her directions for administrative review. He told the newspaper’s editors, Porche and Hosty, that he “did not want to be in a hissing contest between the paper and the administration because [he was running] a business . . . [and] the [U]niversity administration released the funds.” He believed Dean Carter was ordering him and that he had to follow her instructions. After hearing about Dean Carter’s demands from Richards, Porche and Hosty refused to submit any more issues to the printer. Instead, in January 2001, they filed a lawsuit against the University, its trustees, and several administrators, alleging a First Amendment violation.

Until its final issue on October 31, 2000, the Innovator existed as a student-run publication that received student activities fees through the seven-member Student Communications Media Board. The board members were appointed by

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15. Petition, supra note 14, at *5. Never has Dean Carter, the University, or anyone else made a legal claim against the Innovator, Hosty, or Porche for defamation because of these articles.

16. Id. (describing the relationship between the newspaper and the administration).

17. See Brief, supra note 12, at *6 (stating that her goal was to make sure the newspaper met journalistic standards as well as the University’s standards for grammar, punctuation, and composition).

18. Id.

19. Id. at *11 (noting that Richards reported that Carter reminded him that “the University paid his company”).

20. Compare Hosty v. Governors State Univ. (Hosty I), 174 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (“Editorial control is not required for a First Amendment claim; stifling freedom of speech in a forum opened for discussion is sufficient.” (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983))) with Brief, supra note 12, at *8, *23 (asserting that the editors’ own decision not to submit the paper to the printer negates their claims against Carter).

21. See First Amended Complaint, Hosty v. Governors State Univ., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18873 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2001) (No. 01 C 0500) (alleging additional violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments; defamation; invasion of privacy; violation of the Illinois Open Meetings Act; and civil conspiracy) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].

22. See Richard Wronski, Court Rips Governors State University in Illinois for Censoring Newspaper, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 11, 2003, at 6 (noting that the Innovator was founded in 1971 and has not been published since Carter’s phone call to Regional Publishing).

23. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 737; Petition, supra note 14, at *4 (describing the relationship between the media board, the Innovator, and the University administration).
the Student Senate and oversaw the budget of campus media and handled the contracts with printing companies. Dean Carter was not a member of the student media board nor did she have authority to review its decisions. At the time, the University policy toward student publications provided that students will “determine [the] content and format of their respective publications without censorship or advance approval.” Though the Innovator had a faculty advisor, he or she was used only as a resource for ideas and suggestions. For the publication’s almost thirty years in print, the students retained final control of the paper’s content.

The district court found in favor of all of the defendants—either because they were not involved or were entitled to qualified immunity—except for Dean Carter. The district court held that her actions were not justified by Hazelwood, noting that the University had opened the pages of the Innovator to indiscriminate student use, and that the Innovator was a university publication, not a high school publication. Dean Carter appealed the district court’s decision, but a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision. The panel rejected Dean Carter’s suggestion that Hazelwood muddled First Amendment protections because the Supreme Court had specifically reserved the question of its application to colleges and universities. Instead, the panel reasoned that Dean Carter should have recognized the broad First Amendment protections that college and university students traditionally enjoy.

Several months after the panel’s decision, a majority of the Seventh Circuit voted to vacate the panel decision and rehear the case en banc. There, the court held that Dean Carter was entitled to qualified immunity and that Hazelwood “generally appl[ed]” to college and university student speech. After Hosty and Porche filed a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court requested a response brief from the Illinois attorney general, who represented the University. However, the Supreme Court ultimately declined to

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26. See Petition, supra note 14, at *4 (establishing that publications retained full editorial control). But see Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 737 (contending that Carter did not try to alter the newspaper’s operations).
27. Petition, supra note 14, at *4–*5.
28. See Wronska, supra note 22.
29. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 21, at *12–*22. See also Hosty v. Carter (Hosty II), 325 F.3d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 2003) (characterizing the lower court’s treatment of the other defendants in a similar fashion).
30. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 21, at *21.
31. See Hosty II, 325 F.3d at 950 (holding that Carter’s alleged actions defied established constitutional protections of which she should have known).
32. Id. at 948.
33. See id. at 948–49 (characterizing attempts to censor student media as consistently suspect).
34. See Order, Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1330 (2006) (No. 01–1455), vacating as moot, 325 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Order].
35. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 738.
36. See Lyle Denniston, The Supreme Court Requested a Response from Governors State
review the case.\textsuperscript{37}

B. First Amendment Protections in Educational Settings

The First Amendment prohibits government actors from abridging freedoms of speech and of the press.\textsuperscript{38} Courts have applied the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment and generally hold government actors accountable to its standards.\textsuperscript{39} To determine the extent of First Amendment protections, modern courts typically begin by looking at the situation that produced the speech or the physical setting in which the expression existed.\textsuperscript{40} Speech in traditional public fora, including public parks, streets, and sidewalks, receives the greatest level of protection. In a public forum, courts have required that content-based restrictions be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.\textsuperscript{41} When the government has created a public forum by opening an area to indiscriminate use, the same standard applies.\textsuperscript{42} In a nonpublic forum, such as a courtroom, content-based restrictions are allowed so long as they are reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum and are viewpoint-neutral.\textsuperscript{43} Additionally, in any of these fora, the government is permitted to make content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions so long as they are reasonable.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{37} University, SCOTUS\textsuperscript{3}BLOG, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype.

\textsuperscript{38} U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishing rights to freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and freedom to petition the government).

\textsuperscript{39} See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (requiring a company-owned town to comply with the requirements of the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (applying First Amendment protections to state governments in addition to the federal government). \textit{But see} Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (declining to apply a First Amendment analysis because the role and function of the property owners were distinguishable from that of those in \textit{Marsh}); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 560–61 (1972) (allowing a mall owner to prohibit anti-war activists from distributing handouts at a mall because the content was not “directly related” to the purpose of the mall).


\textsuperscript{41} See Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 347; Int’l Soc’y, 505 U.S. at 678; \textit{Ward}, 491 U.S. at 798.

\textsuperscript{42} See \textit{Int’l Soc’y}, 505 U.S. at 678.

\textsuperscript{43} Kincaid v. Gibson 236 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 2001).

Courts have long recognized the importance of free expression in educational contexts.\textsuperscript{45} For example, in refusing to allow a school district to force students to salute the American flag and recite the pledge, the Supreme Court reasoned that preparing students for citizenship was precisely why constitutional protections should be upheld.\textsuperscript{46} The Supreme Court has described institutions of higher education as "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas'"\textsuperscript{47} and proclaimed that "the vigilant protection of constitutional freedom is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."\textsuperscript{48} In the 1960s, college and university students succeeded in "acquiring a new status" as independent adults.\textsuperscript{49} While colleges and universities had previously played a parental role in students' lives, societal changes led students to demand and receive greater autonomy from colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{50} After this shift, the Supreme Court articulated broad protections for student expression on campuses.\textsuperscript{51} The Court has refused to allow a college or university to discriminate against student groups because of their viewpoints,\textsuperscript{52} declared a student's expulsion for distributing a controversial newsletter to be

\textsuperscript{45} See generally Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues' (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection." (citing United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).

\textsuperscript{46} See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ("That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.").

\textsuperscript{47} Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972) (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).

\textsuperscript{48} Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)) (stating that First Amendment protections should apply with no less force at universities than in society at large); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249–50 (1957) (Warren, J., plurality opinion)).

\textsuperscript{49} See Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138–40 (3d Cir. 1979) (characterizing the authoritarian role of the modern university administration as "notably diluted" from that of previous decades, when universities set standards for "general morals" with policies such as limited visiting hours in dorm rooms for members of the opposite sex); Jane A. Dall, Determining Duty in Collegiate Tort Litigation: Shifting Paradigms of the College-Student Relationship, 29 J.C. & U.L. 485 passim (2003) (explaining that “fundamental fairness” replaced “absolute, unchallenged authority” in the university-student relationship).

\textsuperscript{50} See Dall, supra note 49, at 490 (“Demands for student rights on campus corresponded with and grew out of demands for civil rights in the broader public forum.”).

\textsuperscript{51} See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (applying strict scrutiny to a university’s decision to deny a particular student group access to a facility it had designated for public use); Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (reaffirming that “the mere dissemination of ideas,” even if offensive, cannot be prohibited at a public university in the name of decency alone with no suggestion that it was considered libelous or obscene); Healy, 408 U.S. at 189–90 (requiring a university to recognize a controversial student group unless the university had evidence to support the conclusion that the group "posed a substantial threat of material disruption"). Cf. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 (evaluating the First Amendment rights of university professors by noting that the essentialness of freedom in universities was “almost self-evident”) (citing Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250).

\textsuperscript{52} See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267 (holding that the University must “justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable constitutional norms”); Rosenberg, 515 U.S. 819.
unconstitutional, and required a college or university to recognize a student group unless it had evidence that the group would disrupt learning. In Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, the Court noted that “the First Amendment leaves no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to the content of speech . . . .”

Modern jurisprudence addressing speech within the secondary schoolhouse gates began in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District when the Supreme Court permitted students to wear an anti-war armband so long as it would not materially and substantially interfere with classroom activities. In Tinker, however, the Court did not provide guidance about whether, or how, schools could control speech that was sponsored by or connected with the school. The Supreme Court addressed this several years later in Hazelwood by allowing a high school principal to remove two pages of a student newspaper because his actions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” The Court determined that the Spectrum newspaper at Hazelwood High School was not part of any open forum because it was produced during class time, for academic credit, and the teacher routinely made editorial decisions and submitted the newspaper to the principal.

Though the Court declined to decide whether Hazelwood’s reasonableness standard could ever be applied in college and university settings, many commentators and scholars believed courts would not extend the standard that far. The current and former directors of the Student Press Law Center were

53. See Papish, 410 U.S. at 671 (resolving that the government’s legitimate and substantial purpose in protecting its education system cannot endanger fundamental personal liberties when there are less restrictive alternative methods to achieve those same goals).

54. See Healy, 408 U.S. at 184 (determining that the University’s refusal to grant the student group official recognition was a form of prior restraint).

55. Papish, 410 U.S. at 671 (rejecting the argument that the Constitution would grant universities greater leeway to control speech than other government entities).

56. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (rejecting high school administrators’ claims that students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam war was a disruption of the school’s functions and invaded the privacy of others).

57. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988) (articulating the focus of the ruling as to whether the First Amendment requires a school to actively promote particular student speech, whereas Tinker was limited to whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech).

58. See id. at 273 (noting that the articles about teenage pregnancy and students’ parents’ divorces were created in a nonpublic forum).

59. Id. at 268–69.

among those who predicted that courts would not apply Hazelwood to colleges and universities because the majority of college and university student journalists and much of their audience were older, legal adults. They reasoned that colleges and universities played less of a supervisory role over student activities than administrators did in secondary education.

Though several courts have applied Hazelwood to college and university settings, these decisions have been limited to discussions of college and university control of academic activities or the college or university’s own speech. In Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit, and in Brown v. Li, the Ninth Circuit, evaluated the level of control a university exerted over student speech by applying the Hazelwood standard, because the students’ speech in both instances was aimed at achieving a curricular goal and occurred as part of an academic activity for which they received school credit. In Axson-Flynn, the speech was dialogue in a play recited in a drama class, and in Brown, the speech was a graduate thesis submission. In both instances, the court deferred to the university’s authority and expertise to make academic decisions by utilizing the reasonableness standard and emphasizing that neither situation occurred in a public forum. Additionally, in Bishop v. Aronov, the Eleventh Circuit invoked the Hazelwood standard to allow the University at issue to restrict an exercise physiology professor from discussing his religious biases and beliefs during class time. The appeals court held that the speech in question was the University’s own speech and did not occur in any type of public forum because the University had reserved the time for classroom instruction.

The post-Hazelwood case most analogous to Hosty is Kincaid v. Gibson. In Kincaid, the Sixth Circuit held that a public administrator at the University at issue violated the First Amendment by ordering copies of a student-produced yearbook to be confiscated and prohibiting their distribution to students for more than six years. The school official was displeased that the student editor did not use the school’s colors as a background color for the cover, included photos of national current events, and selected the theme “Destinations Unknown.” The appeals court recognized that the University had created a limited public forum and determined that the confiscation could not be justified as either a content-neutral regulation narrowly tailored for a compelling state interest or a reasonable time,

a doctrinal distinction”).

61. Abrams & Goodman, supra note 60, at 728.
62. Id.
63. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1285–87 & n.6 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 952 (9th Cir. 2002).
64. See generally Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277; Brown, 308 F.3d 939.
65. See generally sources cited supra note 60.
67. See id. at 1074 (adopting Hazelwood’s “basic educational mission” and “reasonable restrictions” standard as applicable for colleges and universities to shape their course offerings).
68. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (rejecting Hazelwood’s application to confiscation of a university yearbook).
69. Id. at 345.
place, and manner restriction. The Kincaid Court declined to apply the Hazelwood reasonableness standard explaining only that it is “factually inappposite.” The court did apply Hazelwood, however, for the limited role of providing guidance about how to analyze the type of forum.

Since the Hazelwood decision, the Supreme Court has continued to protect college and university student speech by holding that a college or university cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination when allocating funds for student activities in public fora and allowing colleges and universities to collect fees used to fund a range of student expression. In Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, the Supreme Court ruled that the University could not deny funding to a student newspaper based on its religious perspective once the school created a limited forum for student publications. The Court rejected the argument that the University could prohibit all views on a certain topic, because the Court noted that excluding several views on a controversial topic is “just as offensive to the First Amendment” as excluding one. The decision also reaffirmed that censorship in a college or university setting is a particularly offensive First Amendment violation because the state “acts against a background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.” Again in University of Wisconsin v. Southworth, the Court recognized the “important and substantial purposes” in facilitating a wide range of speech by allowing the University to collect student fees for a variety of student groups, so long as it allocated the funds with viewpoint neutrality. The Court did not allow students who were opposed to some of the student organizations’ messages to chill student activities once the University determined that opening a forum for student activities was consistent with its mission.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Majority Opinion

In the Hosty en banc decision, the Seventh Circuit was charged with determining whether Dean Carter should be granted qualified immunity. This
determination required the court to examine whether the pleadings, viewed in light
most favorable to the student editors, alleged that Dean Carter violated a
constitutional protection.81 If the facts did allege a violation, the court then had to
examine whether that constitutional protection was clearly established at the time
the alleged violation occurred.82

In examining whether the facts alleged a constitutional violation, the court
grappled with several different modes of analysis on its roundabout path to
conclude that the Innovator existed as a designated public forum.83 In this portion
of its analysis, the court concluded that Hazelwood was applicable to colleges and
universities, but that speech protections were also dependent on a forum analysis.84
The court’s forum analysis incorrectly interpreted case law allowing government
control of its own speech as allowing government control of any speech in a
government-funded forum.85 The court also engaged in a useless listing of a
variety of forum-factor combinations, such as the age of the audience and whether
the speech was part of a curricular program but failed to address which of them a
proper forum analysis should consider.86 It did not clarify the purpose of the list or
whether it was suggesting a departure from the traditional practice of determining
forum by looking at the totality of the situation. Then, in the second prong of its
analysis, the court relied on its perplexing earlier discussions to cast doubt on
whether a reasonable college or university administrator would have been able to
determine if Hazelwood applied to a college or university or even, more basically,
what type of forum existed.87 Despite the court’s recognition that the Innovator
created a public forum, and despite its acknowledgment that even in a created
public forum no censorship is allowed, the court determined that free speech
protection for college and university students was an area of unsettled law.88

immunity decisions because the immunity, if granted, protects the person from the suit itself, not
just liability); Order, supra note 34, at 731.
(explaining that qualified immunity should be determined by first looking at whether the facts
allege a violation of a constitutional right, and second by looking at whether the right was clearly
established in the context of the situation).
82. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19
(1982) (reiterating that reasonable public officials should know the laws guiding their actions).
83. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 734–38 (“[T]he Board established the Innovator in a
designated-public forum, where the editors were empowered to make their own decisions, wise or
foolish, without fear that the administration would stop the presses.”).
84. See id.
85. See id. at 737.
86. Id. at 739.
87. See id. at 738–39 (doubting whether a reasonable college official would have been able
to engage in a public forum analysis). But see id. at 744 (Evans, J., dissenting) (“Defendants
concede that the Innovator serves as a public forum.” (quoting Hosty I, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 786)).
1. The Seventh Circuit Confused Government Funding for the Government’s Own Speech, With Government Funding for a Public Forum

To determine whether the facts alleged a constitutional violation, the court began by stating that the Hazelwood decision would provide its starting point because the decision’s standards apply whenever a school pays for speech. This statement sets the tone for the entire decision, and it gets Hazelwood wrong. Though the East Hazelwood High School Spectrum was funded by the local school board, the Supreme Court did not regard payment as the only consideration in determining that the school did not create a public forum, and it did not hold that the forum test should even be applied in university settings. Rather, the Court looked at the totality of the school’s policies and practices, including the following: a) the Spectrum was part of a regular academic class during school hours; b) the newspaper’s advisor made most editorial decisions; and c) the newspaper was routinely submitted to the principal for approval before publication.

Though the Innovator did receive funding through student fees, the First Amendment does not allow the government to control private speakers’ speech in a public forum simply because it provides some degree of financial support. This would incorrectly suggest, for example, that a city official could control a protester’s sign in a public park because the city pays for the park’s maintenance. While changing jurisprudence has allowed municipalities to recover costs from people who organize events at public facilities, the municipalities were still prohibited from editing the style of their handouts or changing the content of their chants, so long as the expressions were constitutionally protected speech.

89. Id. at 734 (stating that Hazelwood applies when a school pays for speech). But see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that it applies to “student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities”).

90. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262, 268–70 (noting the school’s financial support for the paper, but finding no need to even reference this fact in its full forum analysis). See generally Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons From the “College Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN. L. REV. 481, 493 (2001) (discussing Hazelwood’s examination of the newspaper’s relationship to the curriculum, the fact that the teacher made most editorial decisions, and the fact that the newspaper was routinely submitted to the principal before publication, as evidence that it did not exist in a public forum).

91. See Peltz, supra note 90 (discounting the role that school financial support had on the Supreme Court’s forum analysis in Hazelwood).

92. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 118–19 (2001) (prohibiting a school district from denying access to its facilities to a religious group where it had created a public forum); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (prohibiting the University from denying funds to a newspaper based on its viewpoint where it had created a public forum); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273–74 (1981) (prohibiting a university from denying access to its facilities for a student group based on viewpoint where it had created a public forum).

The Seventh Circuit further overlooked distinctions between a college or university paying for speech with its own money and a college or university supporting speech by collecting student fees that are then distributed to student groups on a viewpoint-neutral basis. As the Supreme Court has recognized, student fees are distinguishable from actual college or university funds because they are collected with the express intent of being distributed back into student activities. In many colleges and universities, the distribution of student fees is overseen by student government bodies, and the college’s or university’s role is limited to collection and establishing a bank account. The Court recognized this distinction in Southworth by allowing universities to require an activities fee from students even when that money was later distributed to groups that a student found objectionable. The Court held that as long as the funding determinations were made without regard to viewpoints, funding did not violate students’ rights of association or protections from forced speech. Rather than acknowledge that the Student Communications Media Board at Governors State University distributed funds collected from student fees, the Hosty court declared simply that “freedom of speech does not imply that someone else must pay.”

The Seventh Circuit cited Rust v. Sullivan and National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley as precedent for allowing governments to control speech when it provides financial support. This line of reasoning, however, overlooks the distinction that the individuals in Rust were speaking on behalf of the government. Additionally, in Finley, the government was acting as a patron for the arts, not creating any type of forum for art generally. In Finley, the Court determined that the National Endowment’s guidelines could not alone disqualify an artist from receiving a government grant.

The government must be allowed to make viewpoint-based decisions when obstacles to use of public fora by the same standards it reviews non-monetary obstacles).

94. See Petition, supra note 14, at *3 (indicating that the funding distributed by the Student Communications Media Board comes from a mandatory student activities fee). Compare Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 737 (“The University does not hand out money to everyone who asks.”) with Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (distinguishing permissible viewpoint preferences in the University’s speech from impermissible viewpoint preferences in allocating mandatory student fees).
95. See generally Southworth, 529 U.S. 217.
96. See id. at 229–30 (declaring that the viewpoint-neutral standard of public forum cases protects the interests of the objecting students). The Court also noted that the fees could be considered support of the fee distributing body which would have no First Amendment implications. Id. at 240 (Souter, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 221.
98. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 737.
99. See id. at 736 (interpreting cases about the government’s own speech to apply to an individual’s speech in a public forum).
100. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991) (allowing the government to produce viewpoint-discriminatory speech when it is representing its own policy views ).
102. Id. at 585.
promoting its own policies through its own speech. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Rust, “when Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism and fascism.” In order for policy decisions to have their intended results, the government must be allowed to fund speech it supports without the presumption of creating an open forum. However, the Innovator cannot be considered Governors State University’s speech. The Innovator was established and run as a student organization independent of the University administration, and the funding it received came from student fees. Additionally, it is unlikely anyone would mistake its “speech” for the University’s speech, particularly because the articles were highly critical of the University.

In Finley, the Court ruled that providing guidelines for how the government should distribute a limited amount of money did not constitute categorical viewpoint distinction. The Court again noted that by creating the National Endowment for the Arts, the government had not created a public forum, but instead, was distributing limited funds for a specific policy goal. The Court allowed the government to apply an “inherently content-based ‘excellence’ threshold” in funding decisions, because the government was not purporting to create an overall fund for arts.

Allowing funding to dictate whether a college or university will be held to the extremely deferential Hazelwood standard ignores the traditional mode of forum analysis that is prescribed by the Hazelwood decision itself. Concededly, Hazelwood stands for two different propositions: that 1) schools are presumed not to be public fora; and 2) schools may control the style and content of expression in nonpublic fora so long as the actions are reasonably related to legitimate educational concerns. While the Seventh Circuit was not entirely clear in Hosty which of Hazelwood’s propositions it found applicable to universities, it is clear

103. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 194 (determining that numerous government programs would be found unconstitutional if the government could not advance policy goals through viewpoint-selective funding decisions).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 192–93 (explaining that the government may implement its own viewpoint-based policy without offending the First Amendment). See also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983) (allowing the federal government to subsidize lobbying efforts for some causes and not others).
106. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 737; Petition, supra note 14, at *4.
107. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 582–83 (explaining that “decency and respect” considerations could not be considered viewpoint discrimination).
108. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585.
109. Id. at 586.
110. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (establishing that secondary schools are not presumed to be public fora).
111. Id. at 273 (establishing that a school can exert editorial control over content “so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).
112. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 734 (“Whether some review is possible depends on the
that the court’s emphasis on funding, even though it ultimately concludes that a public forum existed, may confuse those attempting a forum analysis in an educational context.\textsuperscript{113} Further, the court’s failure to acknowledge that \textit{Rust} and \textit{Finely} did not involve a public forum—but rather involved the government’s own speech beyond the forum analysis—has the potential to result in greater confusion and disagreements about First Amendment protections.

By noting \textit{Hazelwood} as its starting point and then not following a traditional forum analysis to determine if \textit{Hazelwood}’s standards should be applied, the \textit{Hosty} court may cause confusion about the case’s applicability to public fora. While referencing \textit{Hazelwood}, the court simultaneously acknowledged that the \textit{Innovator} could be viewed as existing in a public forum.\textsuperscript{114} One explanation for this seemingly inconsistent position is that the court might have meant that a college or university should not be presumed to be a public forum, as \textit{Hazelwood} dicta posits that secondary schools are not presumed to be public fora.\textsuperscript{115} The unanswered questions provide little guidance for future cases, but rather, set the stage for the court’s subsequent grant of qualified immunity based on uncertainty.

2. The Appeals Court Did Not Engage in a Comprehensive Forum Analysis But Rather Examined Isolated Factors and Engaged in Unhelpful Digressions

Beyond looking solely at funding, the \textit{Hosty} court made some attempts to follow the traditional public forum analysis to determine what level of protection the \textit{Innovator} should receive. It isolated age and education levels as inappropriate standards for determining which type of forum exists, without suggesting factors that should properly be considered.\textsuperscript{116} The court also rejected the notion that the distinction between curricular and extracurricular activities should determine what type of forum the newspaper existed in, again without discussing what a forum analysis should consider.\textsuperscript{117} Instead, the court discussed the variety of ways speech could exist in either a created forum or nonpublic forum by addressing various combinations of the forum factors.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{113.} See generally Postings of Adam Goldstein et al., http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/06/21/governors (June 21–July 27, 2005) (discussing that the \textit{Hosty} decision provided immunity from civil liability but not talking about whether college officials have an “automatic right” to censor student publications); Memorandum from Christine Helwick, General Counsel for the California State University system, to CSU Presidents (June 30, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.splc.org/csu/memo.pdf (advising university presidents that \textit{Hosty III} might provide CSU officials with “more latitude than previously believed to censor the content of subsidized student newspapers”).

\textsuperscript{114.} See \textit{Hosty III}, 412 F.3d at 737 (conceding that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the \textit{Innovator} existed in a public forum).

\textsuperscript{115.} See \textit{supra} note 110 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{116.} \textit{Hosty III}, 412 F.3d at 735.

\textsuperscript{117.} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{118.} \textit{Id.} at 737–38 (discussing possible facts that could alter the forum outcome, including
The court correctly stated that age does not determine whether speech occurs in a public or non-public forum, although it did not clarify if it was referring to the age of the speakers or the age of the audience.\footnote{Id. at 735 (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819).} This is in accord with traditional public forum analysis that considers not one factor, such as age or funding, but the range of practices and policies affecting the situation.\footnote{Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 349 (reviewing “the government’s policy and practice . . . as well as to the nature of the property at issue and its ‘compatibility with expressive activity’” and “the context within which the forum is found” to be determinative of the type of forum that existed) (citations omitted).} The court also ruled out education level as a factor for determining the type of forum.\footnote{Id. at 735–36. See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (equating age with educational level). The Seventh Circuit’s equation of age with education level is notable because opponents of college and university censorship normally argue that the age of the students should cast greater suspicion on censorship. Proponents of allowing a college or university to influence editorial content are more likely to posit that the school’s interest in editorial control is part of its educational mission, which is not lessened by the older age of its students.} The court then makes the illogical leap from requiring elementary schools to allow access to created public fora to allowing universities to exert influence over speech in a nonpublic forum.\footnote{Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 735.} While both of these propositions are accurate, neither of them was determined by the speaker or audience’s level of education, and the first proposition lends no support to the second. Rather, in both situations the Supreme Court first determined what type of forum existed and then looked at whether the government’s actions were constitutional.\footnote{See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106 (holding that the state cannot base access to a limited public forum on the speaker’s viewpoint). The Court rejected the argument that the public building being an elementary school has anything to do with granting groups access. Id. at 113-14. The Court found that the group’s access had no effect upon the students because its meetings were after school hours, not sponsored by the school, and open to any student with his or her guardian’s permission. Id.} The Court continued this analysis by noting that \textit{Rust} even allows the government to control adults’ speech in non-public fora.\footnote{See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 735 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)) (overlooking that the Court considered adults’ speech in \textit{Rust} to be not only in a nonpublic forum, but also government speech expressing a legitimate policy preference).} This statement, although accurate, does not directly acknowledge that the speech at question in \textit{Rust} was considered the government’s own speech.\footnote{See id.} This statement again provides no additional guidance for whether the \textit{Innovator} was a public or nonpublic forum.\footnote{See id. at 736 (raising tangential issues about the government’s own speech and the possible role of Carter in supervising the Student Communications Media Board and the possible role of the newspaper’s faculty adviser; but noting that “[n]one is on the record, however, so this possibility does not matter.”).} Instead, the court seemed to be listing a plethora of forum and educational variations in order to illustrate the complexity of determining what type of forum existed.\footnote{See id. at 736 (raising tangential issues about the government’s own speech and the possible role of Carter in supervising the Student Communications Media Board and the possible role of the newspaper’s faculty adviser; but noting that “[n]one is on the record, however, so this possibility does not matter.”).}
The majority also explores several hypothetical possibilities that would prevent the *Innovator*’s extracurricular status from determinatively indicating that the University had created a public forum. In stating that *Rust* and *Finley* would not make sense under a “bright line” test that divided all speech as either curricular or extracurricular, the court seemingly overlooked the possibility that whether something is curricular or extracurricular could be one of several features involved in determining the type of forum. The court then again engages in a hypothetical exercise, describing how a publication could be outside of the college or university curriculum but still in a nonpublic forum. The exception the court notes is that a college or university could hire students for the school’s alumni magazine and then retain control over the content of the magazine. Just as the court failed to recognize that *Rust* involved government speech, this example overlooks the determinative fact that the alumni magazine would still be the college or university’s own speech. This discussion provides no guidance for how a court should conduct a forum analysis and merely serves as support for the court’s later finding that attempting to engage in a forum analysis would have presented too many complexities for Dean Carter.

3. The Court’s Own Perplexing Reasoning Muddles First Amendment Protections, But at the Time of the Censorship, the Law Was Settled

In the second prong of its analysis, the *Hosty* court looked at whether the students’ First Amendment rights were clearly established at the time of Dean Carter’s actions. To answer this question, the court largely relied on its own perplexing attempt at a forum analysis from the previous section, to conclude that Dean Carter should be granted qualified immunity. The court presumed that *Hazelwood* changed speech protections at colleges and universities and allowed Dean Carter to rely on that assumption. In doing so, the court allowed Dean Carter to treat the *Innovator* as the least protected type of speech in an educational setting (speech that is part of a secondary school curricular activity) rather than speech that has traditionally enjoyed the greatest level of freedom (extracurricular speech in an institute of higher education). Additionally, the court failed to address the suggestion that Dean Carter may have actually known the *Innovator* existence of nonpublic fora in the university context without clearly articulating the factors it would consider in a forum determination).

128. See id. (declaring that cases about the government’s own speech, *Rust* and *Finley*, would be “inexplicable” if forum determinations were based on a curricular versus extracurricular distinction).
129. Id. (characterizing an alumni magazine as a publication outside the college and university curriculum, but not created as a public forum).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 739 (noting that “legal and factual uncertainties dog the litigation”).
132. See id. at 738 (rationalizing that because the district court articulated two positions that the majority found inaccurate, Carter could not have been expected to correctly predict degrees of constitutional protections about which the judiciary was in disagreement).
133. See id. (“[T]he Supreme Court does not identify for future decision questions that have ‘clearly established’ answers.”).
was a public forum.\textsuperscript{134}

When the Supreme Court declined to decide whether \textit{Hazelwood}'s deference to educators was appropriate in college and university settings, it did not purport to alter First Amendment protections in colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{135} Rather, the decision has spared college and university students from this lower standard, presumably for various reasons, including maturity differences, differing educational missions, and the traditions of free expression on college and university campuses.\textsuperscript{136} Still, in \textit{Hosty}, the court allowed Dean Carter to take the gamble that a court might rely on \textit{Hazelwood} instead of cases from both before and after \textit{Hazelwood} that protect college and university student speech rights.\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, it failed to acknowledge one of its own prior rulings positing that the Supreme Court does not have to speak for law to be "clearly settled."\textsuperscript{138} While the court asserted that the Supreme Court does not reserve settled areas of law for future decision,\textsuperscript{139} it overlooked the protections the Court subsequently afforded student speech in cases such as \textit{Rosenberger} and \textit{Southworth}.

Though the court does list the three cases that have applied \textit{Hazelwood} to university settings,\textsuperscript{140} it makes no reference to the fact that each of those cases was about either the university controlling its own speech or exerting its authority over academic areas.\textsuperscript{141} Additionally, even in those few cases, the courts predominantly relied on the traditional practice, supported by \textit{Hazelwood}, of leaving academic

\textsuperscript{134} See \textit{supra} note 131 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{135} See \textit{supra} note 1 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{136} See David G. Savage, \textit{Justices OK Censorship by Schools; Say Educators Can Control Content of Pupil Publications}, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1988, at 1 (reporting that the decision did not apply to higher education); Stuart Taylor, \textit{Court, 5–3, Widens Power of Schools to Act as Censors}, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1988, at A1 (reporting that the Court “has suggested” that constitutional rights receive broader protections in university settings). \textit{See also} sources cited \textit{supra} note 60.

\textsuperscript{137} But see \textit{Hosty} III, 412 F.3d at 743 (Evans, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the question should have been whether anything “after \textit{Hazelwood} . . . would suggest to a reasonable person in Dean Carter’s position that she could prohibit publication simply because she did not like the articles it was publishing?”). Cf. \textit{Hope} v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (6-3 decision) (holding that officials can be on notice that their conduct violates the law in novel factual situations without prior caselaw involving "fundamentally similar" or "materially similar" facts); but cf. \textit{Anderson} v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (6-3 decision) (requiring that the contours of a right be “sufficiently clear” and that “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent” to deny qualified immunity).

\textsuperscript{138} See Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942, 945 (7th Cir. 2000):

To rule that until the Supreme Court has spoken, no right of litigants in this circuit can be deemed established before we have decided the issue would discourage anyone from being the first to bring a damages suit in this court; he would be \textit{certain} to be unable to obtain any damages.

\textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Hosty} III, 412 F.3d at 738. “The question had been reserved in \textit{Hazelwood}, and the Supreme Court does not identify for future decision questions that already have "clearly established" answers.” \textit{Id} (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{140} See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).

\textsuperscript{141} See \textit{Hosty} III, 412 F.3d at 738–39.
matters to the discretion of educators.142

Finally, the court overlooked a reference indicating that Dean Carter may have actually known the Innovator was a public forum.143 If true, this should have been enough to preclude immunity, regardless of the court’s application of Hazelwood to a university setting.144 Though the Hosty court’s decision is less than clear about how, or even if, it would apply the Hazelwood standard to a public forum, the court itself noted earlier in the decision that in a public forum there is “no censorship allowed.”145 The court should have consistently applied that standard—even if it was unclear whether Hazelwood could have applied to universities—because in a public forum any controls over content must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.

Whether Hazelwood currently applies in any way to college and university speech should not affect whether First Amendment protections were clear at the time of Dean Carter’s actions. When Dean Carter called the printer, no court had analyzed content controls in a public forum, university or not, under the Hazelwood standard.146 Still none have except the Hosty court. Further, even if Hazelwood applies generally in college and university settings, as the Seventh Circuit points out, its application “depends in large measure on the operation of a public-forum analysis.”147 This would require Dean Carter to evaluate her actions under a public forum analysis whether or not Hazelwood applied.148 Although in a public secondary school Hazelwood supports the presumption that a school newspaper is a nonpublic forum unless the school has taken measures to turn it into one,149 a reasonable public official should still make an initial inquiry to see

142. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978)); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (entrusting the University to protect the academic freedom of its professors when creating policies about professors’ in-class speech). Cf. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225–26 & nn.11–12 (stating that judges may not reverse academic decisions unless they have sufficient evidence that the decisions are so far departed from academic norms to demonstrate that they were made with no actual exercise of professional judgment); Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90 (accepting that academic decisions required expert evaluations and were “not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking”).

143. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 744 (Evans, J., dissenting) (“Defendants concede that the Innovator serves as a public forum.” (quoting Hosty I, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 786)). But see Brief, supra note 12, at *20–*21 (contending that the Innovator did not exist in a public forum).

144. See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 733. Though the court does not indicate how it would evaluate a claim of qualified immunity when the official had actual knowledge of one of the elements of that constitutional right, it seems suspect that the majority disregarded this possibility.

145. See id. at 735 (declaring that in a public forum, no censorship is allowed). In making this statement, the court did not determine whether Hazelwood applies to universities. Id.

146. See id. at 743–44 (noting that all of the cases the majority cited applied to speech in either a curricular setting, or in a setting where the college or university was the speaker).

147. See id. at 738 (refuting its previous characterization of Hazelwood as allowing editorial control whenever a schools “pays”).

148. See id.

149. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (declaring that a school
whether the school has taken any of these steps.

B. Dissenting Opinion

The Hosty dissent, written by Judge Evans, persuasively argued that Dean Carter should not have been afforded qualified immunity.\textsuperscript{150} His basis for that determination was that the alleged constitutional violation was based upon a clearly established right.\textsuperscript{151} According to Judge Evans’ analysis, until the majority’s decision, no court had applied Hazelwood to an extracurricular activity in a university setting.\textsuperscript{152} While both the majority and dissenting opinions recognized that the Supreme Court left the question of Hazelwood’s applicability in college and university settings unanswered, Judge Evans recognized this to mean that Dean Carter should have realized that Hazelwood did not actually change the legal landscape protecting university speech. Additionally, Judge Evans accurately recognized that the few cases the majority cited for applying Hazelwood in a university setting were limited to determining the university’s own speech or exerting its authority over academic matters.\textsuperscript{153}

Judge Evans took the position that the Hazelwood standard should have no place “in the world of college and graduate school” and suggested establishing a grade level cut-off for Hazelwood.\textsuperscript{154} This position directly answers the question the Supreme Court alluded to in the footnote that had been looming over student media for nearly two decades.\textsuperscript{155} By providing a straightforward analysis of the issues at hand, Judge Evans clearly articulated support for the marketplace of ideas at public colleges and universities.\textsuperscript{156}

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\textsuperscript{150} See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 739–44 (Evans, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{151} See id. at 740 (describing the First Amendment principles at stake as “clear”).

\textsuperscript{152} See id. at 743–44 (citing Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that Hazelwood is not applicable to university newspapers); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (declining to apply the Hazelwood reasonableness standard to a university yearbook).

\textsuperscript{153} See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 743–44.

\textsuperscript{154} See id. at 739 (noting that grade level is a “very good” indicator of age, which “has always defined legal rights”).

\textsuperscript{155} See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (1988) (noting “[w]e need not now decide” if the decision’s standards apply in higher education).

\textsuperscript{156} See Hosty III, 412 F.3d at 740–42 (“[T]he precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.” (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972))).
III. SIGNIFICANCE AND AFTERMATH OF HOSTY

A. Implications

The conflicts at Governors State University chilled speech at the campus. The Innovator was never published after Dean Carter’s phone calls. When a new student newspaper was established several years later, the administration attempted to institute a formal prior review policy. When the student editor of the new newspaper refused to comply with the prior review policy, a new conflict was born and the university refused to publicly discuss its policy toward student publications.

By allowing Dean Carter to escape liability without clearly articulating how Hazelwood should apply or without providing guidance for forum analysis in educational settings, the majority decision could become another looming threat over the heads of student media. Vague standards raise particular concerns in the context of the First Amendment because of their potentially irreversible chilling effects. An Illinois district court has relied on the Hosty decision to hold that “[m]any aspects of the law with respect to students’ speech, not only the role of age, are difficult to understand and apply.” The general counsel for the California State University system issued a memorandum to university presidents suggesting that they might have more authority than previously thought to control student speech.

To see how the Hosty decision could affect college and university media, one need only look at how Hazelwood has affected student media in secondary education. In the majority of instances, administrators have been permitted to control student media and turn it into a promotional tool for the schools, devoid of any educational element for its student participants. As a result, students are not

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157. See Joseph Sjostrom, Paper Overlooked After Censorship Storm, Chi. Trib., July 8, 2003, at 1 (noting that the school was without a student newspaper for a year and that the replacement paper has struggled to become relevant); Joseph Sjostrom, Student Editors’ Lawsuit Delayed; Censorship Case Gets New Hearing, Chi. Trib, June 28, 2003, at 16.

158. See Wronski, supra note 22, at 6.

159. See sources cited supra note 157.

160. Id.

161. See generally, Mark J. Fiore, Comment, Trampling the “Marketplace of Ideas”: The Case Against Extending Hazelwood to College Campuses, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1915 passim (2002) (noting a 1997 study that found only one of 101 daily college newspapers surveyed was “strongly curriculum based”). This could suggest that many student newspaper editors believe they exist as a public forum and would be uncertain as to how Hazelwood or Hosty might apply to them. Id.


164. See Memorandum from Christine Helwick, supra note 113.

165. See generally Brief for Student Press Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
encouraged to pursue hard-hitting stories and often leave a journalism education course with little practice or guidance on the proper ways one would pursue such stories. These results harm both journalism students and other students who lose exposure to how the media interacts with society.

The chilling effects of Hosty may not be limited to college and university media. As Hazelwood has been applied to allow control over student government campaign posters and to ban students from wearing certain T-shirts, these decisions could lend support for colleges and universities to prohibit student groups from displaying a particular sign on the campus green or from bringing a particular speaker to a campus rally.166 Further, because the Seventh Circuit was unclear on the role of funding in a forum analysis, a court broadly interpreting the case could determine that independent newspapers and other speech benefitting from any college or university connection might be subject to the administration’s controls.

Additionally, colleges and universities could become vulnerable to liability for the content of their student publications or even for the content of any student speech that was connected with the school.167 While state colleges and universities have until now been insulated from any legal actions against their student press—based on the principle that they had no legal ability to control or review content168—this would no longer be the case. With colleges and universities susceptible to liability, it is less likely that they would encourage students to pursue controversial stories, which are more likely to lead to libel claims. The interest of colleges and universities in avoiding liability, and their mission of education and encouraging a marketplace of ideas will be in direct conflict with each other. For this reason, legal protections for speech should be determined by judges not college and university administrators.

B. Recommendations

Because the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the best possible outcome from this decision is for future courts to recognize the flaws in the Hosty court’s analysis, to reject its application of Hazelwood to university settings, and to recognize the broad First Amendment protections that college and university students have historically enjoyed. This may keep Hazelwood from being read as implying either that colleges and universities should be assumed to be nonpublic fora or that administrators can rely on pedagogical concerns to regulate the private

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166. See Amicus Brief, supra note 165, at *12 (citing Brandt v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 326 F. Supp. 2d 916, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (campaign poster censorship); and Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004) (T-shirt censorship)).

167. See, e.g., supra note 9.

speech of adult students.

Even if, as the Hosty court held, other circuits hold that Hazelwood applies to college and university settings, it is important to consider how the Seventh Circuit intended Hazelwood to apply. The Hosty court was unclear whether Hazelwood should apply to support the proposition that in college and university settings there should be a presumption against a public forum; or to support the proposition that its deferential reasonableness standard should apply to colleges and universities. The lesser of two evils would be to interpret Hazelwood narrowly as standing only for the proposition that a college or university may not automatically be considered a public forum. This would require administrators to review whether they had explicitly created an open forum where censorship is not permitted. This analysis should look at a variety of factors, including whether the speech is part of a curricular activity, whether the speech is college or university speech or student speech, and whether there has been a past practice or policy regarding the school’s control of the speech.

Beyond judicial challenges, students and free-speech supporters can make efforts to establish a public forum on their campus by encouraging college and university leaders to sign pledges recognizing that they intend to let campus media exist without any influence or control of the school. They can also lobby for state laws to provide a higher level of protection for speech. Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, and Massachusetts have passed such laws to protect students’ speech rights, and the Oregon and Illinois legislatures are considering proposing similar protections. Finally, students always have the option to take their speech off campus by producing their own newspapers or, more likely with today’s technological advances, Web sites or blogs.
students do not shed their freedoms at the schoolhouse gate, they have a much stronger grasp on them from the other side of it. While taking speech off campus is the ultimate foil to censorship, this decision has its own drawbacks. For example, once off campus, students may no longer receive the guidance of knowledgeable advisers and may miss out on important aspects of a traditional journalism education.

CONCLUSION

The Hosty decision allowed a university administrator to engage in the most egregious form of censorship, prior restraint. By engaging in a shoddy forum analysis, the Hosty court was able to support its ultimate finding that First Amendment protections for student newspapers at public universities were unclear. The First Amendment lists the freedom of the press explicitly, and this textual distinction has become a part of why some consider governmental attacks on the press to be the epitome of a First Amendment violation. In 1978, Justice Potter Stewart posited that the separate textual reference for press and speech was “no constitutional accident, but an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in American society” and urged courts to recognize that “[t]he Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and to the special needs of the press in performing it effectively.”

The Hosty decision is typical of the increasing hostility toward the media that has come from the Seventh Circuit. In the summer of 2005, Judge Posner, a member of the Seventh Circuit who joined the Hosty majority, rehashed critiques of the media on the front page of the New York Times book section. While attributing the unsupported claims to groups such as “the right,” “liberals,” and “the media,” Posner used the opportunity to proclaim that the media simply responds to the market, and that the principles of self-governance and serving the public interest are merely lofty ideals. Previously, the Seventh Circuit had issued a broad opinion ridiculing the notion that the Constitution provides any support for a reporters’ privilege. This decision has been cited by numerous courts, thus indicating the influence of the Seventh Circuit and some of its feelings toward media protections. While perhaps the Hosty decision should not have been


174. See generally New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714–21 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (describing the historical presumptions against prior restraints and the threats they have on individual liberties, because a prior restraint is both directly in conflict with the literal interpretation of the First Amendment, and strays from the presumption that speech is permissible).


177. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003) (opinion by Posner, J.) (refusing to stay an order compelling journalists to produce tape recordings of interviews).

178. See, e.g., In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004) (affirming a civil contempt order for a journalist who refused to answer questions posed by a special prosecutor); New York Times v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated and remanded
surprising given these circumstances, it has the potential to be nonetheless devastating.

In 1972, long before many of today’s college and university students were born, the Supreme Court declared in *Healy v. James* that it was “break[ing] no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.” The decision determined that a university could not deny a student group recognition out of fear that the group could cause campus disturbances. Rather, it noted that denying the group recognition was an impermissible burden on the students’ ability to participate in campus discourse. In *Hosty*, the University had not even claimed that the newspaper caused a disruption to the campus; only that the University had a right to censor it. If a case similar to *Healy* were to arise in another circuit today, the courts might rely on *Hosty* to defer to the college or university’s determination about what would disturb the campus. Though the Court in *Healy* said it was breaking “no new constitutional ground” with its decision, for the next generation of college and university students, its First Amendment protections could be considered revolutionary.

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179. *See Healy v. James*, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972) (describing its efforts to protect speech as upholding the traditional principles that have protected free speech within an educational context).
180. *Id.*
181. *Id.*